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NomeNclature
1β 	 Likelihood	coefficient
2β 	 Risk	coefficient
Nd		 Number	for	decision	making
 f(x)i	 Fuzzy	number	between	0	and	1
G.M.		 Geometric	Mean																			
n 	 Number	of	maintenance	 significant	precipitating	 
factor	(i)
λOv		 Overall	failure	rate																			
Si		 Risk	scenario
Pi		 Probability	of	occurring	of	risk	element	(i)
N	 Total	number	of	critical	units	above	the	Threshold	
unit	
Xi(u)		 Consequences	 of	 risk	 elements	 (u)	which	 is	 a	
function	depending	on	uncertainty	(U) 
1. INtroductIoN 
It	is	essential	to	have	product	specific	data	(PSD),	based	
on	 which	 the	 product	 could	 be	 maintained	 so	 as	 to	 have	
a	 substantive	 residual	 life	 during	 the	 residual	 product	 life	
cycle.	 Every	 system	 has	 a	 number	 of	 subsystems	 and	 each	
subsystem	 may	 have	 a	 number	 of	 maintenance	 significant	
precipitating	 factors	 (MSPF),	 whose	 in-depth	 analysis	 into	
risk	and	potentiality	of	failure	may	give	necessary	feedback	to	
the	reliability	centered	maintenance	(RCM)	logic	to	determine	
appropriate	 preventive	 maintenance	 (either	 periodic	 or	
predictive)	tasks.	There	are	considerable	numbers	of	systems,	
where	the	failures	may	involve	risk	or	hazard.	This	is	more	seen	
in	the	case	of	defence	products.	In	such	cases,	it	is	necessary	to	
follow	a	systematic	methodology	to	identify	and	prioritize	the	
risks.	In	the	literature,	there	is	no	such	research	paper	giving	
research	work	in	this	area	of	risk	quantification.	In	this	paper,	
a	new	quantitative	method	has	been	suggested	to	estimate	the	
characteristic	criteria	of	risk.		
Fonseca	and	Knapp1	in	their	work	and	as	reported	by	Basu2,	
related	 to	 expert	 system	 for	 reliability	 centered	maintenance	
(RCM),	advocated	the	uses	of	model,	likelihood	index	(LI)	for	
the	equipment	or	product,	being	considered	,	for	prioritization	
of	critical	failure	modes.	Criticality	Analysis	of	various	units	
or	subsystems,	comprising	the	entire	system,	as	stated	earlier	
is	 done	 through	 failure	mode	 effects	 and	 criticality	 analysis	
(FMECA)	using	risk	priority	number	(RPN).	
2. a case study
The	 case	 study	 is	 carried	 out	 for	 road	mobile	 launcher	
(RML) vehicle3	 and	 the	 methodology	 of	 risk	 assessment	 is	
adopted.	Using	the	RPN	values	of	various	units	or	sub-systems	
of	the	total	system	as	shown	in	Table	1,	it	is	possible	to	get	a	
guide	into	the	systematic	method	of	analysis	of	the	algorithm.
The	 authors,	 in	 servicing	 the	 present	 system	 under	
consideration	have	 tried	 to	know	the	preference	amongst	 the	
critical	items,	for	product	specific	servicing	based	on	the	RCM	
logic.	 This	 needs	 identifying	 and	 analyzing,	 for	 each	Hyper	
Critical	unit	or	subsystem,	the	possible	maintenance	significant	
precipitating	factors	(MSPF)	and	subjects	them	to	a	quantitative	
analysis	 to	 obtain	 likelihood	 coefficient	 (LC).	 Each	 MSPF	
may	have	upper	and	lower	level	for	malfunctioning,	known	as	
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abstract
	In	this	paper	authors	have	discussed	risk	quantification	methods	and	evaluation	of	risks	and	decision	parameter	
to	be	used	 for	deciding	on	 ranking	of	 the	critical	 items,	 for	prioritization	of	condition	monitoring	based	 risk	and	
reliability	 centered	maintenance	 (CBRRCM).	As	 time	passes	 any	 equipment	 or	 any	product	 degrades	 into	 lower	
effectiveness	 and	 the	 rate	 of	 failure	 or	malfunctioning	 increases,	 thereby	 lowering	 the	 reliability.	Thus	with	 the	
passage	of	 time	or	a	number	of	active	 tests	or	periods	of	work,	 the	 reliability	of	 the	product	or	 the	 system,	may	
fall	 down	 to	 a	 low	value	known	as	 a	 threshold	value,	 below	which	 the	 reliability	 should	not	 be	 allowed	 to	 dip.	
Hence,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	fix	up	 the	normal	basis	 for	 determining	 the	 appropriate	points	 in	 the	product	 life	 cycle	
where	predictive	preventive	maintenance	may	be	applied	in	the	programme	so	that	the	reliability	(the	probability	of	
successful	functioning)	can	be	enhanced,	preferably	to	its	original	value,	by	reducing	the	failure	rate	and	increasing	
the	mean	 time	between	failure.	 It	 is	very	 important	 for	defence	application	where	 reliability	 is	a	prime	work.	An	
attempt	is	made	to	develop	mathematical	model	for	risk	assessment	and	ranking	them.	Based	on	likeliness	coefficient	
1β and		risk	coefficient	 2β 	ranking	of	the	sub-systems	can	be	modelled	and	used	for	CBRRCM.
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Upper	bound	and	Lower	bound	for	specific	attributes	of	failure.	
While,	appropriating	the	critical	units,	involved	in	a	system,	to	
the	RCM	logic,	it	is	necessary	to	decide	if	the	system	needs	
(i)	 	 Predictive	 	 preventive	 	 based	 	 reliability	 centered	
maintenance		or	
(ii)			Periodic	preventive	based	reliability	centered	maintenance	
and	for	this	purpose,	it	is	essential	to	evaluate	the	specific	
cases	through	a	quantitative	decision	making	equation	as	
given	in	Eqn.	(1)
1
| | ( ) ( ) .(  )
n
j j i i
i
Nd RPN f x factor x
=
= ∑                             (1)
For	the	system	considering	all	critical	items	the	equation	
is	written	as	Eqn.	(2)
1 1
| | [( ) ( ) .(  )]
N n
System j i i
j i
Nd RPN f x factor x
= =
= ∑ ∑                (2)
where	Nd	 is	 the	number	 for	decision	making	considering	all	
hyper	critical	units	or	subsystems	A,	B,	C	and	D.
j -	 	Number	of	critical	items	above	the	thresholding	item,	
in	the	FMECA	study.
f(x)i	-	Being	quantified	by	the	fuzzy	number	between	0	and	
1
n	-	 Number	 of	 maintenance	 significant	 precipitating	
factor	(i)
N -	 Total	number	of	critical	units	above	the	threshold	unit	
obtained	through	statistical	analysis	of	all	RPN	values	
in	system.
The	 number	 evaluated	 [Nd]j	 from	 the	 Eqn.	 (1)	 is	 the	
outcome	 of	 approximate	 reasoning	 algorithm	 consisting	 of	
fuzzy	 mathematical	 formulation,	 relating	 to	 one	 or	 more	
factors,	justifiably	called	maintenance	significant	precipitating	
factors	 (MSPF).	With	 the	 relative	weights	 as	 given	by	RPN	
values,	it	may	be	found	out	for	specific	values	appearing	in	the	
jth	 failure	mode.	Let	 us	 assume	 that	 the	 precipitating	 factors	
denoted	 by	 f(x)	 (i.e.	 a,b,…etc.)	 are	 quantified	 by	 the	 fuzzy	
number	 between	0	 and	 1.	Each	 f(x)	mode	may	have	 several	
factors	to	estimate	its	failure.	Failure	of	each	one	of	the	above	
items,	classified,	may	depend	on	some	precipitating	factors.	All	
identified	precipitating	factors	involved	in	any	failure	mode,	say	
ith	mode,	and	are	expressed	as	trapezoidal	or	triangular	fuzzy	
numbers	so	that	their	contribution	to	the	specific	failure	mode	
could	be	quantified	as	fuzzy	numbers	between	0	and	1.	Based	
on	the	75	percentile	into	the	range	of	RPN	values,	we	find	the	
critical	units	as	classified	in	Table	2.	Normalized	relative	worth	
of	the	subsystems	A,	B,	C,	D	and	E	have	been	shown	in	the	
last	 column	 of	 the	Table	 2.	 Table	 3	 shows	 the	maintenance	
significant	precipitating	factors	(MSPF).	For	DCV1,	the	cost	of	
re-engineering	done	for	bringing	the	contamination	level	and	
proper	operation	of	spool	functioning	within	permissible	limit	
is	shown	in	term	of	Loss	(in	rupees)	in	terms	of	expenditure.	
Similarly	loss	for	other	critical	units	in	terms	of	expenditure	in	
rupees	is	obtained	and	shown	in	Table	3.	The	cost	is	estimated	
on	 the	 basis	 of	 materials	 involved	 and	 the	 cost	 of	 the	 time	
taken	in	investigation	measured	by	man	hour	spent	expressed	
in	rupees.
3. decIsIoN IN regard to PerIodIc or 
PredIctIve PreveNtIve maINteNaNce 
Both	 periodic	 and	 predictive	 preventive	 maintenance	
(PPPM)	may	 be	 followed	 depending	 upon	 the	 feasibility	 to	
reduce	the	failure	rates	of	the	few	identified	critical	elements	
or	 subsystems	 and	 thereby	 increase	 the	mean	 time	 between	
failure	(MTBF).	This	consequently	helps	us	in	determining	the	
residual	life	of	the	system	as	a	whole.	For	each	of	the	critical	
unit	 or	 subsystems,	 there	 are	 again	 various	 Maintenance	
significant	 precipitating	 factors	 (MSPF),	 which	 are	 having	
upper	and	lower	bounds.
Systematic	 flow	 diagram	 shows	 the	 specific	 detailed	
procedure	 involved	 in	 determining	 the	 typical	 PPPM	 to	 be	
involved	at	the	appropriate	level	of	RCM.	Depending	upon	the	
ratio	of	Nd	(obtained	from	Eqns.	(1)	and	(2)	and	the	threshold	
RPN,	we	can	perfectly	rank	each	of	the	critical	sub-systems. 
Table 1. Name of units of system with their RPN values3
Sl 
No.
Name of unit 
/Subsystem
rPN 
value
rank Remark
1 P.T.O. 72 Since	values	of	
RPNs	in	the	table	
show	Extremely	
asymmetrical	
probability	
distribution,	the	
median	approach	
which	is	a	realistic	
one	is	used	in	
determining	threshold	
value.	Here	in	this	
case	study,	the	
Threshold RPN 
number	is	96.	
*classified	 as	Critical	
items.
2 Pump 90
3 Pressure	line	
filter
120* IV
4 DCV1 168* I
5 Tilt	cylinder 144* II
6 Outrigger	
cylinder
90
7 DCV2 144* III
8 Pump 96 Threshold
9 Motor 80
Table 2. Name of units of system with their criticality category
S/n from Table 1 Designated by Name of unit /Subsystem Category RPN Value rank Relative worth
4 A DCV1 Super	critical 168 I (168/672)=0.25
5 B Tilt	cylinder Hyper	critical 144 II (144/672)=0.21
7 C DCV2 Hyper	critical 144 III (144/672)=0.21
3 D Pressure	line	filter Hyper	critical 120 IV (120/672)=0.18
8 E Pump Threshold 96 - 	(96/672)=0.15
∑=672
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| | | |
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n n
j System
j j
Threshold Threshold
Nd Nd
RPN RPN
= =
   
   
   = = λ   
   
      
∑ ∑                         
(3)
It	may	be	stated	that	if	λ>	1,	it	would	be	judicious	enough	
to	 have	 the	 total	 system	 on	 a	 condition	 monitoring	 based	
predictive	 preventive	maintenance	 in	 the	 reliability	 centered	
maintenance	(RCM)	Logic.	
Figure	1	shows	flow	chart	for	reliability	analysis	on	the	
basis	of		MTBF	and	CBMTBF.	λOv	 is	the	overall	failure	rate	
of	the	system	and	as	such	λOv	is	the	reciprocal	of	(MTBF)Overall. 
By	CBFTA	is	meant	the	fault	tree	analysis	of	the	system	using	
condition	based	monitoring.
Now	it	is	also	possible	to	designate	the	ratio	of	
1
| |
| |
j
Threshold
Nd
Nd
 
= β 
 
																																																								(4)
Figure	 2	 shows	 the	 information	flow	diagram	 for	 using	
the	effect	of	maintenance	significant	precipitating	factors	of	a	
unit	in	the	system,	in	the		RCM	logic	for	determining	the	type	
of	maintenance.
Using	 fuzzy	 method	 for	 evaluating	 the	 precipitating	
factors	 in	each	mode	and	using	 the	RPN	value	as	weightage	
for	each	mode	of	failure,	a	quantified	decision	making	equation	
for	 likelihood	 coefficient	 could	 be	 developed	 to	 find	 out	
if	 any	 failure	mode,	 out	 of	 the	 critical	modes	 should	 be	 put	
on	 condition	 based	 continuous	 monitoring.	 The	 author	 has	
been	trying	this	as	a	new	methodology	while	considering	the	
evaluation	of	the	residual	life	of	the	equipment.
4. rIsk QuaNtIfIcatIoN aNd 
classIfIcatIoN 
Risk	to	be	denoted	by	(R)	can	be	described	as	a	set	of		(i)	
risk	 elements.	According	 to	Kaplan	 and	Garrich4	 the	 risk	 is	
given	by	Eqn.	(5)	.
[ ] { , , ( )}R Si Pi Xi u= 																																																							(5)
where	 Si is risk scenario,	 which	 is	 multidimensional;	 Pi 
is	 probability	 of	 occurring	 of	 risk	 element	 (i);	 and	 Xi(u) – 
Consequences	of	risk	elements	(u)	which	is	typically	a	function	
depending	on	uncertainty	U. 
This	has	also	been	advocated	by	Bindel5,	et al.	According	
to	Shelab6,	et al.	uncertainty	generates	risk	and	is	founded	on	
poor	or	missing	information	or	lack	of	appropriate	database.
Maintenance significant 
precipitating factor
Observed value 
at test
unit Name of 
unit
Loss (in Rs) in terms of 
expenditure
Improper	flow	of	oil	due	to	oil	contamination	level	
Oil	flow	ranges	from	100	(lpm)	to160	(lpm)					 120
A DCV1 25000
Spool	not	working	due	to	improper	power	supply		ranges		from	
18	V	to	24	V				 20
Leakage		through	seals	(Improper	oil	flow)
High	value		160	(lpm),		Low	value	100	(lpm)				 120
B Tilt	Cylinder 200000
Improper	pressure	of	oil	
High	value	200	(bar)	and	Low	value	100	(bar)				 150
Pressure	not	properly	maintained
High	value	160	(bar)	and	Low	value	100	(bar) 120 C DCV2 25000
Filter	clogging	due	to	contamination	of	oil
Pressure	ranging	from	1-3	bar	(Pressure	drop)
2	bar D Pressure	line	
filter 10000
Table 3. Maintenance significant precipitating factors (msPf) of the system
Figure 1. Reliability and condition based predictive preventive 
maintenance.
Figure 2.  MSPF Items on PM (Periodic or Predictive).
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Functioning	of	every	critical	item	in	a	system	depends	on	
some	degree	of	uncertainties	and	every	uncertainty	generates	
risk.	Each	risk	faces	a	challenge	or	threat,	normally	indicated	
quantitatively	 by	 losses.	 These	 losses	may	 be	 classified	 into	
main	four	categories	as	shown	in	Fig.	3.	These	four	losses	are	
the	prime	threats	involved,	whenever	a	failure	or	malfunctioning	
of	any	critical	system	or	subsystem	occurs.
Selvik	 and	 Avent7 have	 advocated	 in	 their	 paper	 the	
usefulness	of	using	risk	and	reliability	centered	maintenance.	
Risk,	 as	 it	 is	 seen,	 is	 dependent	 on	 both	 (i)	 event	 and	
consequences	 of	 the	 events	 and	 (ii)	 uncertainties	 involved.	
Uncertainties	involved	may	result	in	a	drastic	change	of	time	
schedule	and	the	target	objectives,	as	well	as	loss	of	reputation.	
Such	 uncertainties,	 though	 can’t	 be	 assessed	 quantitatively,	
researchers	try	to	evaluate	qualitatively,	by	giving	the	scale	of	
high,	low,	and	medium	(H,	L,	and	M),	respectively,	to	ascertain	
(i)	 The	 degree	 of	 uncertainties	 (ii)	 degree	 of	 sensitivity	 (iii)	
degree	of	importance	and	(iv)	overall	impact.
where	N	is	the	total	critical	subsystems,	principally	responsible	
for	the	failure	of	the	system.
For	each	precipitating	factor	MSPF,	the	relative	worth	rij is 
dependent	on	(a)	degree	of	uncertainty	(b)	degree	of	sensitivity	
(c)	degree	of	importance	and	(d)	Overall	impact	to	be	assessed	
by	using	analytic	hierarchy	process	as	shown	below.
Figure 3.  Losses threatened by risk.
5. QuaNtItatIve evaluatIoN of rIsk
Usual	method	for	assessing	the	risk	is	 through	potential	
losses	(financial)	in	terms	of	expenditure	for	servicing,	repair,	
maintenance	 including	 cost	 of	materials,	 spare	 parts,	 etc	 for	
each	maintenance	significant	precipitating	factor	(i)	of	a	hyper	
critical	 item	 or	 sub-system	 J.	 Total	 risk	 involved	 may	 be	
expressed	by	the	relationship:
1
     | | ( )
n
th
J ij i j
i
Risk of J Critical Subsystem Risk W
=
= = π∑        (6) 
where	i,	is	the	attribute	of	the	risk.	Here	it	is	the	characteristic	
probability	of	MSPF,	as	shown	in	Table	3.		 1 2, ,...J J iJπ π π  	are	
the	total	monitory	losses,	while	W1j, W2j	..	are	the	precipitating	
factors i of jth	critical	subsystem.	Since,	 in	most	of	 the	cases	
MSPF	of	each	subsystem	vary	with	upper	and	lower	bound,	it	
may	be	worthwhile	to	use	the	probability	based	on	fuzzification	
of	variation	of	each	parameter	between	upper	and	lower	bound	
as	between	1	and	0.	The	Eqn.	(6)	gives	the	risk	of	Jth	subsystems,	
but	since	it	may	be	worthwhile	to	find	out	the	risk	involved	in	
total	 failure	 of	 system	 considering	 all	 the J	 subsystems,	 the	
author	 prefers	 to	 access	 the	 same	 from	 the	 overall	 equation	
involving	risk;	by	using	quantified	decision	making	equation	
given	by	Eqn.	(7).
1
 | | ( )
N
System j j
j
Risk W Risk
=
= ∑                                          (7)
Matrix I Matrix II
Risk Criteria a b c d g.m. Worth
Degree	of	uncertainty a 1 4 6 2 2.632 0.491
Degree	of	sensitivity b 1/4 1 2 1/4 0.594 0.111
Degree	of	importance c 1/6 1/2 1 1/5 0.359 0.067
Overall	impact d 1/2 4 5 1 1.778 0.331
 1
1 2 3
1
. . . . ...
n n
n
i n
i
G M a a a a a
=
 
= =   
∏ 			where		G.M.	is	Geometric	
Mean
Multiplying	Matrix	I	by	Matrix	II	,	we	obtain	Matrix	No.	
III		as	shown	hereunder.
[Matrix III]		=
1.999
0.449
0.269
1.355
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dividing	Matrix	III	by	Matrix	II,	we	get	Matrix	IV,	 the	
values	being	known	as	λ.
[Matrix IV]		=				
4.071
4.045
4.015
4.093
λ
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
From	Matrix	 IV,	 λ
avg.
	 =	 4.056,	 	N	 -	Number	 of	 criteria	
used,	Viz.	4
Consistency	index . 4.056 4( . .) 0.019
1 4 1
avg NC I
N
λ − −= = =
− −
Now	the	consistency	 ratio	C.R.	 is	given	as	 (C.I.)/(R.I.),	
where	the	values	of	R.I.		are	to	be	obtained	from	the		following	
Table	given	by	Saaty8,	based	on	N.
CR=0.0019/0.90	 =	 0.021	 which	 is	 much	 less	 than	 0.1,	
hence	 the	assumptions,	based	on	 test	and	practices,	 reflected	
in	Matrix	I,	which	evaluates	the	relative	worth	of	each	of	the	
significant	criteria	for	risk	are	justified.
N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
RI 0 0 0.58 0.90 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41
Quantitative	equation	for	risk	evaluation,	may	be	modified	
as
1
| | ( ) . . . .
n
J ij i j aj aj bj bj cj cj dj dj
i
Risk W r r r r
=
= π = π + π + π + π∑   (8)
Now	 the	 Eqn.	 (7)	 is	 modified	 by	 substituting	 in	 it	 the	
Eqn.	(8),	derived	above	to	obtain	the	new	Eqn.	(9)	including	
both	attributes	of	risks	(a,b,c,d)	and	the	relative	worth	of	every	
subsystem	A,B,C,D	as	per	Table	2.
Total	risk	of	the	system	is	:
1
 | | [ . . . . ]
n
System i aj aj bj bj cj cj dj dj
i
Risk W r r r r
=
= π + π + π + π∑       (9)
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The	Eqn.	(9)	gives	the	value	of	risk	in	terms	of	monetary	
loss.	In	the	event	of	failure,	in	terms	of	expenditures	involved	
in	repair,	maintenance,	administrative	logistics,	etc.	It	is	seen	
that	pump	(having	serial	no.	8)	in	Table	1	is	the	thresholding	
subsystem.	In	the	event	of	failure	of	this	thresholding	unit,	the	
financial	expenditure	(or	monetary	loss)	for	the	same	may	be	
found	out	from	equation	of	cost	based	risk	in	the	form	shown	
below
| |Threshold Th ThRisk W= π × 																																																(10)
where Thπ is	 the	 expenditure	 in	 the	 event	 of	 failure	 or	
manufacturing	of	the	thresholding	unit
ThW -the	relative	worth
Risk	number	for	the	system	 | |SystemRN 	based	on	the	failure	
of	 the	 critical	 units	 above	 threshold	 value	 is	 given	 by	 Eqn.	
(11)
| |
| |
| |
System
System
Thewshold
Risk
RN
Risk
=                                             (11)
1
[ . . . . ]
| |
n
i aj aj bj bj cj cj dj dj
i
System
Th Th
W r r r r
RN
W
=
π + π + π + π
=
π ×
∑
where	i	stands	for	units	A,	B,	C,	D,	respectively.
The	value	of	unit	A	can	be	obtained	as	given	in	Eqn.	(12)
[ . . . . ]
| | A ajA ajA bjA bjA cjA cjA djA djAA
Th Th
W r r r r
RN
W
π + π + π + π
=
π ×
      (12)
Similarly,	 for	 units	 B,	 C,	 D	 the	 Risk	 number	 can	 be	
obtained.	 This	 gives	 an	 importance	 Index	 based	 on	 the	 risk	
attributes	of	each	sub-unit	(A	or	B	or	C	or	D)	as	given	in	Eqn.	
(13).
2
| |
| |
j
Thewshold
Risk
Risk
= β
                                                       (13)
Using	 Eqn.	 (4)	 and	 Eqn.	 (13)	 we	 get	 1 2( )β + β 	 as	 the	
decision	parameter	to	be	used	for	deciding	on	ranking	of	the	
critical	items,	for	prioritization	of	CBRRCM	as	suggested	by	
Singh9.
Based	 on	 the	 data	 obtained	 from	 the	 history	 of	 costs	
involved	 in	 repairing	 the	units	A,	B,	C,	D	 failing,	 and	costs	
involved	 in	 the	 various	 types	 of	 attributes	 of	 risk	 for	 each	
one	of	the	units,	Viz.	a,	b,	c,	and	d	as	shown,	while	analyzing	
through	AHP	(See	matrix	I),	the	detailed	data	are	presented	in	
Table	4.
Sample	calculations	based	on	data	in	Table	4	and	Table	
2	are	given	as:
| | 20000 0.491 10000 0.111 15000 0.067
													20000 0.331 18555
ARisk = × + × + × +
× =
| | 50000 0.491 25000 0.111 25000 0.067
														150000 0.331 78650
BRisk = × + × + × +
× =
| | 20000 0.491 10000 0.111 15000 0.067
														20000 0.331 18555
CRisk = × + × + × +
× =
| | 5000 0.491 2000 0.111 5000 0.067
															5000 0.331 4667
DRisk = × + × + × +
× =
| | 5000 0.491 2000 0.111 15000 0.067
																							20000 0.331 10302
ThresholdRisk = × + × + × +
× =
Using	Eqn.	(9),	we	can	obtain	 | |SystemRisk as
| | 0.25 18555 0.21 78650 0.21 18555
																				0.18 4667 25891.86
SystemRisk = × + × + × +
× =
Using	 Table	 3,	 the	 functions	 are	 plotted	 for	 DCV-1,	 tilt	
cylinder,	DCV-2	and	pressure	line	filter	as	shown	in	Figs.	4-7	
respectively.	The	maintenance	significant	precipitating	factors	
(MSPF)	are	considered	and	specified	limiting	range	is	used	to	
represent	X-axis.	The	function	line	graph	is	drawn	as	straight	
line	with	minimum	to	maximum	values	of	control	parameters	
with	 function	 value	 0	 to	 1.	 The	 observed	 value	 during	 tests	
is	represented	with	marking	which	represents	functional	value	
as	in	Fig.	4	which	is	ƒ(xA1)	=	0.33.		This	value	is	obtained	by	
formulation	as:	
.
.
120 100
																												 0.33
160 100
Observed Value Min Limiting ValueFunction Value
Maximum Value Min Limiting Value
−= =
−
− =
−
This	value	is	to	be	controlled	for	the	MSPF	hence	it	should	
be	less	than	observed	test	function	value.	On	similar	basis	all	
other	function	values	are	obtained	and	are	represented	in	Figs.	
4-7.
The j	values	of	 jNd 		are	obtained	using	Eqn.	(1)
1 2| | ( ) [( ) ( ) 168(0.33 0.33) 110.88A A xA xANd RPN f f= + = + =
unit Sub-system Critical 
rank
Relative 
worth
Financial loss due 
to risk factor (Rs)
A DCV-1 I 0.25 a 20000/-
b 10000/-
c 15000/-
d 20000/-
B Tilt	
Cylinder
II 0.21 a 50000/-
b 25000/-
c 25000/-
d 150000/-
C DCV-2 III 0.21 a 20000/-
b 10000/-
c 15000/-
d 20000/-
D Pressure 
Line	Filter
IV 0.18 a 5000/-
b 2000/-
c 5000/-
d 5000/-
E Pump	 Threshold 0.15 a 5000/-
b 2000/-
c 5000/-
d 5000/-
Table 4. Relative Worth’s and cost data based on risk criteria
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1 2| | ( ) [( ) ( ) 144(0.33 0.5) 118.58B B xB xBNd RPN f f= + = + =
1| | ( ) [( ) ] 144(0.33) 47.52C C xCNd RPN f= = =
1| | ( ) [( ) ] 120(0.5) 60D D xDNd RPN f= = =
1| | ( ) [( ) ] 96(1) 96Threshold Threshold xThresholdNd RPN f= = =
Using	Eqn.	(2)	 | |SystemNd 	is	obtained	as
| | 110.88 118.58 47.52 60 336.98SystemNd = + + + =
The	value	of	ratio	
336.98
3.510
( ) 96
System
Threshold
Nd
RPN
 
 λ = = =
  
The	values	of	 1β for	factors	A,	B,	C,	and	D	are	obtained	
using	Eqn.	(4)	as	follows:
1
1
110.88
1.155
96
A
A
Threshold
Nd
Nd
 
β = = = 
  
1
1
118.58
1.234
96
B
B
Threshold
Nd
Nd
 
β = = = 
  
1
1
47.52
0.495
96
C
C
Threshold
Nd
Nd
 
β = = = 
  
1
1
60
0.625
96
D
D
Threshold
Nd
Nd
 
β = = = 
  
By	using	the	Eqn.	(11)	risk	numbers	(RN)	can	be	obtained	
as	
| | 25891.86
| | 2.513
| | 10302
System
System
Thewshold
Risk
RN
Risk
= = =
Similarly	we	can	find	out	the	| RN	|	number	for	each	of	the	
critical	units	by	using	the	following	equation
| | 18555
| | 1.801
| | 10302
A
A
Thewshold
RiskRN
Risk
= = =
| | 78650
| | 7.634
| | 10302
B
B
Thewshold
RiskRN
Risk
= = =
| | 18555
| | 1.801
| | 10302
C
C
Thewshold
Risk
RN
Risk
= = =
| | 4667
| | 0.4530
| | 10302
D
D
Thewshold
RiskRN
Risk
= = =
Table	5	gives	the	Relative	Worth’s	of	the	factors	on	the	
basis	of	combined	effect	of	 1β 	and	 2β . 
6. result aNd dIscussIoNs
Reliability	and	risk centered	analysis	 is	done	giving	 the	
details	of	quantitative	equation	developed	for	risk	assessment.	
Steps	are	discussed	to	systematically	evaluate	the	extent	of	risk	
involved	by	using	a	quantitative	decision	making	equation.
 Figure 4.  Factor Xa (DCV-1).
 Figure 5.   Factor Xb (tilt cylinder).
  Figure 6. Factor Xc (DCV-2).   
Figure 7. Factor Xd (filter clogging).
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By	 using	 the	 quantitative	 decision	 making	 equation	
developed,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 prioritize	 the	 risk-based	
components	 in	 the	 system	 and	 rank	 them	 accordingly.	 Such	
a	 system	of	CMRRCM	gives	a	glimpse	 into	newer	horizons	
of	maintenance	activity,	hitherto	far	from	practices	 in	Indian	
Industries.	But	such	a	method,	if	used,	will	lead	to	improved	
reliability	based	design	of	the	system	with	reduced	failure	rate 
and	hence	increased	MTBF	and	hence	residual	life	of	the	design.
Based	 on	 factors	 1β 	 and	 2β ,	 suggested	 by	 the	 author,	
ranking	 of	 the	 sub-systems	 can	 be	 modeled	 and	 used	 for	
CMRRCM.	Based	on	this,	it	may	be	possible	for	obtaining	a	
quantifiable	justification	to	consider	the	system	(or	some	of	the	
critical	units	of	the	system)	on	the	basis	of	CMRRCM.
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Critical sub-
systems 1β 2β 1 2( )β + β
Relative worth on the basis of  
1 2( )β + β
Ranking on the basis of  
1 2( )β + β
A 1.155 1.801 2.956 0.1944 II
B 1.234 7.634 8.868 0.5834 I
C 0.495 1.801 2.296 0.1510 III
D 0.625 0.453 1.078 0.0709 IV
∑=15.198
Table 5. Relative Worth’s of the factors on the basis of combined effect of 1β  and 2β
